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Introduction 
The September 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent War on Terror stimulated a 
revival of just war theory in the United States so far in this century.1 The argument that the 
War on Terror is one of the paradigmatic cases of just war has received wide support from 
conservatives, the liberal left, and Christian theologians alike. In fact, in February 2002, 
more than sixty American intellectuals signed a document entitled “What we’re fighting 
for: a letter from America,” which decisively backed the War on Terror. As Jean Bethke 
Elshtain, one of the authors of this document, puts it, “the events of September 11 inspired 
Americans, from President Bush to the average man and woman on the street, to speak of 
justice […] When citizens evoke justice, they tap into the complex Western tradition called 
‘just war’.”2 
   Despite the general sentiment expressed in this 2002 document, however, evalu-
ations of the American war against Iraq in 2003 are split into two irreconcilable camps 
among just war theorists. Michael Walzer, well-known just war theorist and another con-
tributor to “What we’re fighting for,” is basically critical of the Iraq war, saying that the 
threat of the Hussein regime did not justify a defensive war by the United States or any 
other country. Jean Bethke Elshtain, conversely, argues that it is the obligation of the Unit-
ed States to defend universal values like freedom and democracy everywhere, and draws 
on just war tradition to support the Iraq war. How can such opposite standpoints be found 
in the same idea of “just war”? This question is more complicated than it seems at first 
glance, since, as co-signers to “What we’re fighting for,” both Walzer and Elshtain were 
once united in supporting the Afghan war in 2001. 
   This article aims to answer this question by distinguishing two strands or tradi-
tions of just war theory. In fact, the doctrine of just war, which can be traced back 1,600 
years ago to the era of St. Augustine, is the gathering of particular ideas that are joined 
together in their family resemblance yet are still different in fundamental ways. The differ-
ence between the modern just war theory and the premodern one is particularly substantial 
                                                 
1  An earlier version of this article was presented at the 10th Annual International Conference on Politics & 
International Affairs, Athens Institute for Education and Research (Metropolitan Hotel of Athens, Greece, 
18 June, 2012). I appreciate helpful comments of Ghazi Falah, Shak Hanish, and Chris Mahony, and I also 
want to thank Renita Cole, not only for improving my English but also for valuable comments and sug-
gestions. 
2  ELSHTAIN, Jean Bethke. Just War against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World. New 
York: Basic Books, 2004a. p. 50. 
12   MATSUMOTO, M. The American just war theory in the 21st century 
 
 
Protestantismo em Revista | São Leopoldo | v. 30 | p. 11-31 | jan./abr. 2013 
Disponível em: < http://periodicos.est.edu.br/index.php/nepp> 
and significant. Historically, the doctrine of just war was born far earlier than the emer-
gence of the modern sovereign state system, and has not always been suitable for the sys-
tem in some crucial respects. In my analysis, Michael Walzer belongs to the modern just 
war tradition which can be dated from Hugo Grotius of the 17th century, while Jean 
Bethke Elshtain belongs to the premodern one of St. Augustine. 
   Several articles have already been written about the revival of just war theory in 
the U.S. foreign policy and intellectual discourses. However, there has been little systemat-
ic attempt to explain how such different traditions can coexist within the same system of 
thought. The novelty of this article is to provide an analytical framework for understand-
ing the differences within just war theory with particular attention to its historical devel-
opment and changes. Just war theory is not uniform. This fact of pluralism should be 
made clearer, all the more because the just war perspective has now captured more and 
more attention across the political spectrum. 
   This article proceeds as follows: it first introduces Walzer and Elshtain, and 
briefly explains the background of the study. Secondly, it defines and contrasts the mod-
ern and premodern just war traditions with a brief, historical overview. Thirdly, it devel-
ops the modern and premodern distinction further by presenting a detailed analysis of 
their conflicting judgments of the Iraq war. Finally, this article discusses which tradition 
has become more popular in the recent American just war discourses.  
 
 
Background 
The United States and its allies launched the war against Iraq in March 2003. Un-
like the Afghan war, which received worldwide support, the Iraq war was fought despite 
much skepticism regarding its legitimacy. The first justification for this military action was 
the suspicion that Iraq was developing and possessing weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). Iraq had not fully been cooperating with the United Nation’s inspection regime. 
This refusal to cooperate violated the Security Council’s prescriptions and posed a grave 
threat to the security of the United States and other countries. But even if Iraq had actually 
possessed WMD, Iraq would not have been likely to use them against the United States by 
themselves. The real concern of the Bush administration was the possibility that Iraq 
might have transferred WMD to anti-U.S. terrorist organizations like Al Queda; thus, the 
United States resorted to a preemptive strike so as to prevent this possibility.  
Just war theorists in the United States have made differing judgments about this 
war. In this section, I present the viewpoints of Walzer and Elshtain, and set the record 
straight concerning the background of this study. 
 
The just war response 1: Walzer 
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Michael Walzer, one of the key figures in contemporary just war theory, has re-
peatedly argued against the Iraq war, though he supported the Afghan war. “America’s 
war is unjust. Though disarming Iraq is a legitimate goal, […] it is a goal that we could 
almost certainly have achieved with measures short of full-scale war.”3 According to 
Walzer, the Iraqi problem could have - and therefore should have - been resolved without 
recourse to war. The alternatives could have been to extend the no-fly zones to include the 
whole country, to impose stricter economic sanctions, and to expand the U.N. monitoring 
system.4 Instead, Walzer believes, the United States treated the Iraqi problem in an im-
proper time, in an improper manner. 
This claim is drawn from his conviction that in principle “Nothing but aggression 
can justify war”.5 The Hussein regime did not commit any direct attack on the United 
States or its forces at that time or any time in the past. The regime was brutal indeed, but 
this was first and foremost the matter of its domestic affairs and did not have to do with 
the legitimacy of international warfare. “It is a feature of just war theory in its classic for-
mulations that aggression is regarded as the criminal policy of a government, not as the 
policy of a criminal government.”6 In essence, the Iraqi case did not meet this standard nor 
was it included in Walzer’s “classical formulations” of just war. 
As a matter of fact, it was revealed after the war that Iraq had not developed and 
did not possess WMD, nor did it have any cooperative relationship with Al Qaeda. The 
primary ground of the war - that Iraq was a threat to the security of the United States and 
the world - had now collapsed. Nevertheless, other just war theorists, like Jean Bethke El-
shtain, continue to justify the Iraq war on another ground; that is, the humanitarian 
ground to liberate the Iraqi people. 
 
The just war response 2: Elshtain 
In contrast to Walzer’s response, Elshtain “took up the Iraq War and decided that, 
on balance, just war criteria were met.”7 From this view, the Hussein regime had terror-
ized religious minorities and forced their people to live under oppression - acts that were 
sufficient enough to justify the Iraq war as a war of liberation. As a direct result of the Iraq 
war, the dictator is gone and the Iraqi people are liberated. To put it differently, Elshtain 
considered the Iraq war as just on the ground of the criminality of the regime in itself. 
Unlike Walzer, Elshtain’s “just war criteria” does not depend on the crime of ag-
gression. Rather, she appeals to a conceptually distinct case of just war as ending brutality. 
                                                 
3  WALZER, Michael. Arguing about War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. p. 160. 
4  WALZER, 2004, ch. 11. 
5  WALZER, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. 4th. ed. New 
York: Basic Books, 2006. p. 62. 
6  WALZER, 2006, p. x. 
7  ELSHTAIN, 2004a, p. 183. 
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The Iraq war is a kind of humanitarian intervention seen within this point of view. Ac-
cording to Elshtain, the existence of aggression is certainly important, but not the sole de-
terminant of just war. “Those who argue that no legitimate casus belli existed either be-
cause we had not been attacked directly or because there was no evidence of the threat of 
WMD are […] ignoring the centuries-old rationale in the just war tradition concerning us-
ing force to protect the innocent.”8 Clearly, Walzer and Elshtain use different measures 
here to determine the right and wrong of the war. 
Why do Walzer and Elshtain use different measures? The answer is suggested in a 
response that the latter addressed to the former: 
I dissent somewhat from Walzer’s insistence that, in the classical formula-
tions of just war, aggression is regarded as “the criminal policy of a gov-
ernment, not as the policy of a criminal government.” […] In the earliest 
formulations of the just war tradition - I think here of St. Augustine - pre-
venting certain harm to the innocent, even though they may not be your in-
nocent, might be an occasion for the justifiable use of force.9 
Elshtain makes an important point here: not only are there several just war tradi-
tions, but she and Walzer belong to different ones, and these may lead to different conclu-
sions in particular cases. It is not just a matter of inconsistency or miscomprehension on 
either side. The crux of the matter lies in the fact that multiple discourses are lumped to-
gether under the same heading of “just war theory” rather than being distinguished. 
 
Preceding studies 
The disagreement between Walzer and Elshtain has deeper roots than at first ap-
pearance. In “the classical formulations of just war” to which the former belongs, the war 
against the criminal policy of a government (i.e. aggression, or CPG hereafter) is the paradig-
matic case of just war, within which the Iraq war does not fit and thus is considered illegit-
imate. In “the earliest formulations” to which the latter belongs, the war against the policy 
of a criminal government (i.e. harming the innocent, or PCG hereafter) is the paradigmatic 
case of just war, within which the Iraq war does fit and thus is considered legitimate. It 
does seem strange that such different, and sometimes competing, claims are found in the 
same theory system. Putting aside the reality of the war, we need to explicate the true 
meanings of these “classical” and “earliest” modes of just war theory to grasp the differ-
ence between the two. 
Regrettably, there has been little systematic attempt to investigate this question 
concerning the diversity of the contemporary American just war theory. A problem with 
                                                 
8  ELSHTAIN, 2004a, p. 188. 
9  ELSHTAIN, Jean Bethke. Terrorism, Regime Change, and Just War: Reflections on Michael Walzer. Jour-
nal of Military Ethics, v. 6, n. 2, p. 131-137, 2007. p. 136-137. 
MATSUMOTO, M. The American just war theory in the 21st century  15 
 
 
Protestantismo em Revista | São Leopoldo | v. 30 | p. 11-31 | jan./abr. 2013 
Disponível em: < http://periodicos.est.edu.br/index.php/nepp> 
the preceding studies is their failure to acknowledge the diversity to begin with. Craw-
ford, Hayden and Snauwaert, for instance, are based on the assumption that the paradig-
matic case of just war is the war against CPG and ask if the Iraq war falls within the para-
digm.10 This way of questioning, however, would not be able to treat the Elshtainian just 
war theory properly. On the contrary, Weigel is basically on the same side of Elshtain and 
revises the paradigmatic case of just war from the PCG point of view,11 which would 
sharply conflict with the Walzerian just war understanding. 
A second shortcoming of the preceding studies is that even when they recognize 
differing views, the differences were not fully articulated. For instance, Flint and Falah 
point out that the rhetoric of defending human rights has become the main factor of just 
war thinking in the United States along with the geopolitical assumption of territorial sov-
ereignty.12 Miller classifies the useful distinction between the “invasion model” and the 
“rescue model” as the justifying causes of the Iraq war.13 The framework of these studies 
coincides with the disagreement between Walzer and Elshtain stated above, but neither 
study makes clear why such diversity comes about within a single theory system. Lee cor-
rectly points out that their dissent has its historical roots in their different just war tradi-
tions and thus is closest to the subject of this article.14 However, Lee has not addressed the 
systematic analysis of the traditions themselves. 
In short, the flaw of the preceding studies is that they fail to explain, or even rec-
ognize, the diversity found within the contemporary American just war theory. As a re-
sult, they tend simply to assert one version and to ignore another, or to make use of them 
arbitrarily according to their political precommitment. However, neither Walzer nor El-
shtain adapts a particular tradition to justify their opinion regarding particular wars. Both 
traditions are equally authentic. To understand the reason why such diversity exists, we 
need to return briefly to the historical background of how just war theory has developed 
and changed. 
 
 
Comparing modern and premodern just war traditions 
                                                 
10  CRAWFORD, Neta C. Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War. Perspectives on Politics, v. 1, n. 1, 
p. 5-25, 2003; HAYDEN, Patrick. The War on Terror and the Just Use of Military Force. In: LANSFORD, 
Tom; WATSON, Robert P.; COVARRUBIAS, Jack (Eds.). America’s War on Terror. 2nd. ed. Farnham: Ash-
gate, 2009. p. 49-71; SNAUWAERT, Dale T. The Bush Doctorine and Just War Theory. Online Journal of 
Peace and Conflict Resolution, v. 6, n. 1, p. 121-135, 2004. 
11  WEIGEL, George. The Just War Tradition and the World after September 11. Journal of Catholic Thought 
and Culture, v. 5, n. 3, p. 13-44, 2002. 
12  FLINT, Colin; FALAH, Ghazi-Walid. How the United States Justified its War on Terrorism: Prime Morali-
ty and the Construction of a “Just War”. Third World Quarterly, v. 25, n. 8, p. 1379-1399, 2004. 
13  MILLER, Richard B. Justifications of the Iraq War Examined. Ethics and International Affairs, v. 22, n. 1, p. 
43-67, 2008. 
14  LEE, Peter. Blair’s Just War: Iraq and the Illusion of Morality. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. ch. 3. 
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Up to this point, the discussion has shown that the competing judgments of 
Walzer and Elshtain over the Iraq war are rooted in the “classical” and “earliest” formula-
tions of just war respectively. Now, where is the splitting point of the two? One clue is to 
compare Augustine with those after him. Just war theory, with a long history that can be 
traced back to the ancient Roman Empire, has witnessed some crucial changes in the pro-
cess of development. An especially important change is the theoretical transformation that 
correlates with the emergence of the modern sovereign state system in the 17th century. 
This section will provide a closer look at this momentous time. 
 
‘The Grotian moment’ 
It was 17th century lawyer Hugo Grotius (b. 1583-1645), who played a historically 
influential role in the modern reformation of just war theory. He formulated his theory in 
the age of religious wars, and his seminal work The Rights of War and Peace (1625) was writ-
ten exactly to overcome this miserable circumstance. At that time, the authority of Christi-
anity had declined, while absolutist monarchies had usurped this place of power. In light 
of this complex international reality, Grotius’s purpose was to find a new basis of interna-
tional order other than religion. 
The basis Grotius found instead of religion was a worldly natural law. He refor-
mulated just war theory that had been developed in the interpretation of theological doc-
trines since Augustine, into a legal doctrine. The first principle of the natural law from Cic-
ero’s time is self-preservation. Grotius explains the justice of war by referring to this first 
principle. “Among the first Impressions of Nature there is nothing repugnant to War; nay, 
all Things rather favour it: […] since Nature has given to every Animal Strength to defend 
and help itself.”15 Therefore, so the explanation goes, just like an individual is permitted to 
commit violence for self-defense by the natural law, so is a country permitted to appeal to 
war for self-defense by the same natural law. 
Grotius’s legalistic assumption was fitting with the international reality of his 
days. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 that ended the Thirty Years’ War included a new 
international norm today known as the sovereign state system. Grotius tried to legitimize 
this coming reality in terms of just war by questioning why and to what extent a state had 
the right to engage in war. His answer was that the relation between states was governed 
by nearly the same rule as that between individuals. Each state was counted as a judicial 
personality, and was called sovereign because of this formal independence. The view that 
each sovereign state constituted some kind of social relationship, or a so-called “society of 
                                                 
15  GROTIUS, Hugo. The Rights of War and Peace. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005. p. 182-183 [bk. 1 ch. 2 sec. 
1]. 
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states,”16 on an international scale was fundamentally different from the one governed by 
the premodern Christian supranationalism. I call this change in the perception of interna-
tional relations “the Grotian moment” to invoke the term of Richard Falk.17 
Falk attributes to the Grotian moment the perception that “states, and only states, 
assert sovereignty claims in relation to authority over bounded territorial units in a man-
ner that is formally recognized within contemporary annals of diplomacy.”18 This may be 
charged with anachronism, and the charge is true, since Grotius himself did not limit the 
main actors in international relations to states, nor defend their sovereign equality.19 It was 
not until Emerich de Vattel a century later that the sovereign state system with the princi-
ple of nonintervention was defended in just war writings. Nevertheless, since the focus of 
this article is not on what Grotius said then but rather on what he left today, I accept this 
anachronism. Indeed, Grotius has surely been one of the main sources for later sover-
eignists.20 
To those familiar with the framework of the Westphalian system, the story so far 
may sound quite reasonable. However, it should be pointed out that, at least in terms of 
the history of just war theory, Grotius’s assumption was utterly alien to premodern think-
ers. 
 
Augustine and the tranquility of order 
Premodern just war theory before the time of Grotius was developed by Christian 
theologians such as Thomas Aquinas, Vitoria, and Suárez.  For these Christians, their main 
theological source was St. Augustine (b. 354-430), a father of the ancient Roman Empire. 
Augustine, faced with territorial incursions by German pagans, worried about the future 
of his Empire and formulated the conditions for Christian Roman citizens to be rightly 
engaged in war in his various books, including City of God. Christianity, a pacifist religion, 
had already been Rome’s established religion since 380. To solve the conflict between their 
pacifist ideal and the realistic need for military service, theologians arrived at what we 
now call just war theory. Since then, it has been developed as a theological doctrine.  
The first obligation for Christians is a search for peace. The role of just war theolo-
gians is thus to argue that wars do not always contradict with this obligation.21 A war’s 
                                                 
16 See BULL, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. 2nd. ed. Hampshire: Macmil-
lan Press, 1995. p. 26-31; WIGHT, Martin. International Theory: The Three Tradition. Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1991. p. 37-40.  
17  FALK, Richard. The Grotian Moment: Unfulfilled Promise, Harmless Phantasy, Missed Opportunity? In: 
Law in an Emerging Global Village: A Post-Westphalian Perspective. New York: Transnational Publishers, 
1998. 
18  FALK, 1998, p. 5. 
19  GROTIUS, 2005, bk. 1 ch. 1 sec. 2. 
20  OPPENHEIM, Lassa. International Law: A Treatise. v. 1: Peace. New York: Longmans, 1905. sec. 54. 
21  To be more precise, Augustine distinguishes an eternal peace accomplished in the City of God and a 
temporal peace accomplished in Earthly City. The peace related to the question of war is the latter. 
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foremost purpose is to establish peace; a war that does not meet this purpose can never be 
justified. “Indeed, even when men choose war, […] their desire in fighting is for peace 
with glory. […] Hence it is an established fact that peace is the desired end of war.”22 The 
peace Augustine has in mind here is not necessarily achieved by stopping fighting - if so, 
the war should not have been started in the first place. He defines the substance of peace 
as “the desired end of war” as follows: “the peace of the whole universe is the tranquility 
of order.”23 Peace, for Augustine, is accompanied with justice and order, and carries nor-
mative implications in itself. 
This shows a sharp contrast with Grotius’s definition of peace. Grotius defines 
peace as a dual concept, rather than the purpose, of war. Namely, he thinks of war as “not 
the Act of Hostility, but the State and Situation of the contending Parties,”24 and defines 
peace simply as the absence of war.25 Indeed, in spite of his book’s title The Rights of War 
and Peace, Grotius devotes most of the pages to explore the rights of war, and argues about 
the rights of peace itself only in one chapter.26 Grotius’s definition is crystal-clear in that 
there is no peace with war and no war with peace. This is consistent with the idea of sov-
ereignty in assuming that breaking borders amounts to breaking peace, and, thus, is pro-
hibited. 
In contrast, Augustine requires those who launch a war to establish “the tranquili-
ty of order,” which may well go beyond maintaining existing borders. If something awful 
(e.g. harming innocent people) occurs within or without our own territory, just peace on 
earth cannot be maintained except by purposely stopping that atrocity. A just peace can be 
broken even in the absence of war. In this case, just war theory recommends rectifying an 
unjust peace by forceful means. “Be a peacemaker, therefore, even in war, so that by con-
quering them you bring the benefit of peace even to those you defeat.”27 This claim is 
plainly inconsistent with the modern international principles of sovereignty and noninter-
vention. 
 
 
The origin of the defensive/aggressive dichotomy 
The Augustinian concept of just war carries an implication completely alien to the 
modern way of thinking; that is, an offensive war undertaken without a preceding exter-
                                                 
22  AUGUSTINE. City of God. London: Penguin Books, 2003. p. 866 [bk. 19 ch. 12]. 
23  AUGUSTINE, 2003, p. 870 [bk. 19 ch. 13]. 
24  GROTIUS, 2005, p. 134 [bk. 1 ch. 1 sec. 2]. 
25  As to Grotius and the negative definition of peace, see DOWER, Nigel. The Ethics of War and Peace. Cam-
bridge: Polity Press, 2009. p. 137-138. 
26  GROTIUS, 2005, bk. 3 ch. 25. 
27  ATKINS, E. M.; DODARO, R. J. (Eds.). Augustine: Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004. p. 217. 
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nal invasion is not necessarily considered unjust for Augustine.28 The defensiveness and 
offensiveness of war are only neutral analytical concepts that describe a war’s function, 
and Augustine does not distinguish the two analytically in the first place.29 The justice of 
war lies in any case in establishing “the tranquility of order.” Indeed, the main focus of the 
medieval theological just war theorists since Augustine fixated on the question of whether 
an offensive, not defensive, war was ever justified in a concrete situation. Vitoria and 
Suárez, for instance, made clear that some offensive wars could be just, with reference to 
Augustine.30 As Carl Schmitt puts it, “In the Middle Ages, just war could be a just war of 
aggression.”31 
Grotius rewrote these premodern just war ideas. Having an emerging new inter-
national order of the sovereign state system in sights, he rebuilt the paradigm of just war 
on the normative dichotomy of defensive/aggressive wars. On the surface, Grotius seems 
to follow the Augustinian formulation of just war without any rectification.32 But at the 
same time, he interprets it in his own way and reformulates it as part of defending oneself 
“in a general sense’: 
Saint Austin, when he said, that Those Wars which are to revenge our Injuries, 
are generally termed Just: He took the Word Revenge in a general Sense, 
which implies all Removal, Cessation, Abolition, and Reparation of Injuries 
[…] The first Cause therefore of a just War, is an Injury, which tho’ not done, 
yet threatens our Persons or our Estates.33 
As a result, the medieval question of how an offensive war can be just ceases to be 
Grotius’s immediate concern. In fact, he does not explicitly treat the justification of offen-
sive wars in The Rights of War and Peace except in some minor cases.34 This shift of focus 
from offensive to defensive wars is remarkable when compared with the late-medieval 
just war theorists, who sought the former’s justifiability at considerably more length. 
                                                 
28  Indeed, his famous definition of just war (see n.32 below) can be counted as a kind of offensive wars. 
TUCK, Richard. The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to 
Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. p. 55. 
29  “Augustine’s just war did not attempt to distinguish between offensive and defensive warfare.” RUS-
SELL, Frederick H. The Just War in the Middle Ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. p. 21.  
30  VITORIA. Just War in the Age of Discovery. In: REICHBERG, Gregory M.; SYSE, Henrik; BEGBY, Endre 
(Eds.). The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. p. 310; 
SUÁREZ, Justice, Charity, and War. In: REICHBERG, Gregory M.; SYSE, Henrik; BEGBY, Endre (Eds.). 
The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. p. 341, 343. 
31  SCHMITT, Carl. The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum. New York: 
Telos Press Publishing, 2003. p. 119. The reason may be that they understood the essential nature of war 
as an act of punishment. Indeed, for just war theorists including Grotius before the 20th century “outlaw-
ing war,” it was taken for granted that punishment was even a main just cause for war. LUBAN, David. 
War as Punishment. Philosophy and Public Affiairs, v. 39, n. 4, p. 299-330, 2011. 
32  Compare GROTIUS, 2005, p. 393 [bk. 2 ch. 1 sec. 1] with AUGUSTINE. Just War in the Service of Peace. 
In: REICHBERG, Gregory M.; SYSE, Henrik; BEGBY, Endre (Eds.). The Ethics of War: Classic and Contem-
porary Readings. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. p. 82. 
33  GROTIUS, 2005, p. 396-7 [bk. 2 ch. 1 sec. 2]. 
34  GROTIUS, 2005, p. 866 [bk. 2 ch. 16 sec. 16]. 
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“The Grotian moment” refers to the development of just war theory to foster this 
paradigm change. Grotius replaced the task of establishing just peace by war if necessary 
with the rule of not attacking until being attacked or threatened, which strengthened a 
new idea of modern state sovereignty. This Grotian idea came at last to enter the 20th cen-
tury positive international law after many twists and turns. In 1924, the Protocol for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes by the League of Nations explicitly prohibited 
the war of aggression for the first time, stating that “a war of aggression constitutes […] an 
international crime.” The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War in 1928 prohibited 
the use of war as an instrument of national policy, while The U.N. Charter in 1945 prohib-
ited the threat or use of force in general except for individual and collective self-defense 
under the Article 51. Indeed, the above-mentioned process of “outlawing war” was hailed 
as the rebirth of Grotianism in the 20th century by international lawyers and jurists such 
as Corjellis van Vollenhoeven, Quincy Wright, Hersch Lauterpacht, Robert Jackson, and 
Joseph B. Keenan.35 
 
The ambivalence of Grotius on humanitarian intervention 
The argument that the Grotian just war theory takes a new and modern look may 
be questioned because the Augustinian idea of just peace can also be found in Grotius’s 
writings. For instance, in a chapter entitled “The causes of undertaking war for others” of 
The Rights and Peace and War, Grotius states that the inhumane treatment of parents, the 
homicide of foreigners and cannibalism taking place in a country provide grounds to in-
tervene. Based on these statements, some interpret Grotius as encouraging the establish-
ment of just peace even if this may override sovereignty. Lauterpacht, for one, evaluates 
Grotius’s work as “the first authoritative statement of the principle of humanitarian inter-
vention.”36 
However, it may be insufficient to judge Grotius as a humanitarianist based solely 
on a small part of his book.37 First, Grotius admits the sovereign is the absolutist position 
to have citizens at his mercy as long as it is in line with the purpose of establishment, and 
even states that “the State has a Power to prohibit the unlimited Use of that Right [to se-
cure themselves from Injuries by Resistance] towards every other Person, for maintaining 
                                                 
35  See JEFFERY, Renée. Hersch Lauterpacht, the Realist Challenge and the “Grotian Tradition” in 20th-
Century International Relations. European Journal of International Relations, v. 12, n. 2, p. 223-250, 2006; 
YAMAUCHI, Susumu. New Just War Theory of the 20th Century: The Rebirth of Grotius and the United 
States. Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics, v. 36, p. 1-20, 2008. 
36  LAUTERPACHT, Hersch. The Grotian Tradition in International Law. British Yearbook of International 
Law, v. 23, n. 1, p. 1-53, 1946. p. 46. 
37  See FURUKAWA, Terumi. Punishment. In: ONUMA, Yasuaki (Ed.). A Normative Approach to War: Peace, 
War, and Justice in Hugo Grotius. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. p. 232-6; VINCENT, R. J. Grotius, Hu-
man Rights, and Intervention. In: BULL, Hedley; KINGSBURY, Benedict; ROBERTS, Adam (Eds.). Hugo 
Grotius and International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. p. 243-246. 
MATSUMOTO, M. The American just war theory in the 21st century  21 
 
 
Protestantismo em Revista | São Leopoldo | v. 30 | p. 11-31 | jan./abr. 2013 
Disponível em: < http://periodicos.est.edu.br/index.php/nepp> 
publick Peace and good Order.”38 Secondly, for Grotius, humanitarian intervention is not 
a distinct category but a kind of punitive war, which means a military act by foreign coun-
tries on behalf of the superior when he does not fulfill his own obligation to stop the atroc-
ity. Thirdly, Grotius emphatically warns not to open war too quickly even if it seems to 
meet the standard of just cause, since the possibility of ignorantia invincibilis [invincible 
ignorance] cannot be avoided. In particular, the right of punishment including interven-
tion is more likely to be abused, and thus requires a higher standard than the case of ordi-
nary defensive wars.39  
Besides these considerations, there could be some tensions between parts of such a 
voluminous book that would allow different interpretations depending on the emphasis 
taken. Hedley Bull, for instance, calls Lauterpacht’s humanitarian interpretation of Grotius 
“solidarism,”40 and distinguishes it from his own “pluralistic” interpretation, which em-
phasizes the significance of international sovereignty.41 I do not ask further which is more 
authentic, because the focus of this article is not on Grotius himself but on Grotianism 
found in the later development of just war theory. Thus, for the purpose of analyzing the 
multiplicity of the American just war theory in the following sections, I conclude that Gro-
tius was a sovereignist who rehabilitated the premodern just war paradigm by applying 
the modern principle of sovereignty. 
 
 
Why Walzer opposes the Iraq war 
As discussed above, the traditions of just war theory are roughly divided into a 
modern view, rooted in Grotius, and a premodern one, originating from Augustine. While 
the Augustinian tradition sometimes permits us to fight an offensive war to build just 
peace, the Grotian tradition draws the justice of war from the authority of the secular nat-
ural law, which ultimately leads to condemning offensive wars as an international crime 
of aggression. With the historical background of the modern and premodern traditions in 
mind, the current American just war theory and its multiplicity can be analyzed and better 
understood. In the following two sections, I will examine the disagreement between 
Walzer and Elshtain over the Iraq war in more detail, and see how each is respectively in-
fluenced by these different traditional backgrounds. 
                                                 
38  GROTIUS, 2005, p. 338 [bk. 1 ch. 4 sec. 2]. 
39  GROTIUS, 2005,  p. 1276-1277 [bk. 3 ch. 4 sec. 4]. 
40  BULL, Hedley. The Grotian Conception of International Society. In: BUTTERFIELD, Herbert; WIGHT, 
Martin (Eds.). Diplomatic Investigations: Essays on the Theory of International Politics. London: George Al-
len & Unwin, 1966. 
41  BULL, 1995. Cutler names the solidaristic interpretation “Grotianism” and the pluralistic interpretation 
“new Grotianism.” CUTLER, A. Claire. The “Grotian Tradition” in International Relations. Review of In-
ternational Studies, v. 17, n. 1, p. 41-65, 1991. 
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Walzer as a Grotian 
Walzer opposes the Iraq war because it does not meet the required condition that 
the country made a mistake of external aggression, or CPG (the criminal policy of a gov-
ernment), as defined earlier. Now, why does Walzer think that the war against CPG - and 
only it in principle - is the paradigmatic case of just war? Previous studies point out that 
Walzer is a “statist” who puts more emphasis on state sovereignty than individual wellbe-
ing.42 Though this evaluation is basically correct, the question still remains why Walzer 
does so. The simple answer is that Walzer’s just war theory is heavily influenced by Groti-
us. Walzer begins with the statement that “There exists an international society of inde-
pendent states” and “This international society has a law that establishes the rights […] of 
territorial integrity and political sovereignty,”43 which he calls the “legalist paradigm.” 
This legalist paradigm can be attributed to Grotius because such a statement has been de-
veloped by international jurists since Grotius’s age and has been institutionalized in 20th 
century international law. 
The legalist paradigm entails the logic of “domestic analogy.”44 The logic is, in a 
word, to compare the legal and moral standing of states in an international society with 
that of individuals in a domestic society. An individual has the inviolable rights to her life 
and liberty. Thus she is ready to exclude by violence if necessary those who threaten to 
violate these rights. In domestic criminal law, this is defined as righteous self-defense. The 
domestic analogy is the logic originally coined by Bull to apply the justification of this in-
dividual case to the sovereign states that constitute an international society. Walzer readily 
accepts this logic with his own positive interpretation.45 
Interestingly, we can find the same analogy in Grotius’s writings. He describes a 
state’s sovereignty as something like human will, and its power as something like a hu-
man body. “Let us then see what this Sovereign Power may have for its Subject. The Sub-
ject then is either common or proper: As the Body is the common Subject of Sight, the Eye 
the proper; so the common Subject of Supreme Power is the State; which I have before 
called a perfect Society of Men.”46 As I mentioned before, this legalistic way of thought 
                                                 
42  DOPPELT, Gerald. Statism without Foundations. Philosophy and Public Affairs, v. 9, n. 4, p. 398-403, 1980; 
LUBAN, David. Just War and Human Rights. Philosophy and Public Affairs, v. 9, n. 2, p. 160-181, 1980.  
43  WALZER, 2006, p. 61. 
44  WALZER, 2006, p. 58-63. 
45  WALZER, 2006, p. 339, n. 9. Note, however, that the terminology of Walzer is quite different from that of 
Bull. For Bull, on the one hand, domestic analogy is a matter of order, the consequence of which is to ac-
cept the Hobbesian state of nature or the Kantian universal state. For Walzer, on the other, domestic anal-
ogy is a matter of rights and justice, the consequence of which is to defend the Grotian view of interna-
tional society. This leads further to the confusion that although their views of international relations are 
not so different, Walzer is positive toward domestic analogy while Bull is negative. 
46  GROTIUS, 2005, p. 259 [bk. 1 ch. 3 sec. 7]. 
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was matched with the international reality of the emerging sovereign state system after the 
Treaty of Westphalia. 
Based on this analogy, just as an individual is allowed to defend oneself by vio-
lence, so is a country allowed to defend itself by war. Therefore, as confirmed in contem-
porary international rules,47 when a country violates the territory and property of another, 
this is labeled as a criminal act of aggression and is rightly resisted by forceful means if 
necessary. “The domestic maxim is, punish crime to prevent violence; its international 
analogue is, punish aggression to prevent war.”48 Here Walzer recognizes international 
relations as possessing a social nature that resembles a domestic society, which in turn 
shows that his just war theory is built within the Grotian perception of international rela-
tions, thereby putting the idea of state sovereignty at its center.49 
 
Defensive war, not humanitarian intervention 
Of course, Walzer would not stick to state sovereignty at any cost. He admits the 
need for revising the “legalist paradigm” and for launching humanitarian intervention 
when the acts “that shock the moral conscience of mankind” occur and remain unstopped 
in a foreign country.50 In fact, in the face of the transforming international situation of the 
1990s, Walzer seems to loosen the condition for intervention.51 Thus we can find in him the 
same ambivalence as in Grotius. Still, Walzer urges to be very cautious about universaliz-
ing and generalizing the case for intervention on this PCG (the policy of a criminal gov-
ernment) ground. “I don’t mean to abandon the principle of nonintervention - only to 
honor its exceptions.”52 
In any case, the Iraq war could never have been categorized as humanitarian in-
tervention even under Walzer’s lax standard for intervention.53 Iraq certainly did commit 
gross human right violations in the past, but, as the Human Rights Watch reports, there 
                                                 
47  For instance, the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) in 1974 gives the definition that “Ag-
gression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of another State” and “The First use of armed force by a State […] shall constitute prima facie 
evidence of an act of aggression.” 
48  WALZER, 2006, p. 62-63. 
49  By the way, Walzer draws the normative source of sovereignty from the moral standing of communities 
rather than the legal standing of states, and understands the evil of aggression from the former’s view-
point. WALZER, 2006, ch. 4; Thinking Politically: Essays in Political Theory. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2007a, ch. 13; The Crime of Aggressive War. Washington University Global Studies Law Review, v. 6, 
n. 3, p. 635-643, 2007b. In this sense, his just war theory may have to be described not as “statist” but as 
“communitarian,” just as he is often called so in the field of political philosophy. 
50  WALZER, 2006, p. 101-108. 
51  See MATSUMOTO, Masakazu. Governing Violence by War? Michael Walzer on Humanitarian Interven-
tion. In: HAGIWARA, Yoshihisa (Ed.). Democracy and Governance for Civil Society. Tokyo: Fukosha, 2010. 
52  WALZER, 2004, p. 81. 
53  WALZER, 2006, p. xiii. 
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was no imminent dangerous situation in Iraq at the point of war.54 Indeed, in Walzer’s 
evaluation, the setting of the no-fly zone in northern Iraq had played the role of a kind of 
humanitarian intervention, and made further military campaign unnecessary.55 From his 
point of view, the United States did not have a reason to go to war with Iraq.56 
 
Why Elshtain supports the Iraq war 
As the last section highlights, Walzer accepts the “classical” formulation of just 
war to stop CPG and questions the legitimacy of the Iraq war. Elshtain arrives at the oppo-
site evaluation. She favours the Augustinian “earliest” formulation that takes PCG more 
seriously, and defends the Iraq war as a humanitarian intervention, if not a defensive war. 
A more important point is that the premodern just war tradition to which she belongs 
does not always respect the modern self-defense/aggression dichotomy. In this section, I 
take a closer look at Elshtain’s understanding of Augustine and its influence on her view 
about the Iraq war. 
 
Elshtain as an Augustinian 
The relation of Elshtain to Augustine is more direct and easier to find than that of 
Walzer to Grotius. Elshtain is known as one of the authoritative scholars of Augustine by 
several of her works including Augustine and the Limits of Politics,57 and she herself men-
tions that “Most recently, I find myself tagged an ‘Augustinian political theorist’.”58 In-
deed, her just war theory almost entirely owes itself to Augustine’s writings, in striking 
contrast to Walzer, a contemporary of the same generation who rarely mentions even the 
name of Augustine in his work. 
Before September 11 and the War on Terror, Elshtain had constructed her just war 
theory based on Augustine’s definition of peace.59 To reiterate, Augustine’s definition is 
that “the peace of the whole universe is the tranquility of order.” Peace in this sense means 
not a mere absence of war but the order achieved in accordance with justice. The crucial 
thing is to accomplish just peace, not unjust peace, either inside or outside of the country. 
                                                 
54  ROTH, Kenneth. Was the Iraq War a Humanitarian Intervention? Journal of Military Ethics, v. 5, n. 2, p. 84-
92, 2006. 
55  WALZER, 2007a, p. 298. 
56  However, Walzer does not think that the war of Iraq to resist the United States was legitimate. WALZER, 
2004, p. 160. In a word, the Iraq war was illegitimate for both sides. 
57  ELSHTAIN, Jean Bethke. Augustine and the Limits of Politics. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1995a. 
58  ELSHTAIN, Jean Bethke. The Just War Tradition and Natural Law. Fordham International Law Journal, v. 
28, n. 3, p. 742-755, 2004b, p. 742. 
59  ELSHTAIN, 1995a, p. 105-12; ELSHTAIN, Jean Bethke. Women and War: with a new epilogue. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995b. p. 128-132. 
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It is a common mistake to think that peace is maintained only because CPG is successfully 
prohibited.  
With this Augustine’s definition of peace, even if Iraq had merely accepted the 
U.N. inspection in 2003 and abandoned WMD, it would not have resolved the heart of the 
matter leading to the Iraq war. The true issue to be resolved was that the Hussein regime 
continued to be oppressive toward the Iraqi people and internal minorities.60 Thus El-
shtain came to the conclusion that just peace would not have been achieved in Iraq if the 
Hussein regime remained intact. “Just war flows from caritas in the interest of a just pax or 
peace. Thus, one might say that there was no peace for the Iraqi people under the brutal 
regime of Saddam Hussein.”61 From this point of view, the Iraq war to overthrow the re-
gime and to liberate the people was a war against PCG in search for just peace; namely, it 
was a just war. 
 
Humanitarian intervention, not defensive war 
Accepting the Augustinian definition of peace gives Elshtain’s just war theory a 
flavor of the Middle Ages. The problem is to establish peace as “the tranquility of order” 
no matter where it is established. This does not fit with the modern recognition that the 
maintenance of existing borders be considered a peaceful state of affairs and the violation 
of them be considered an international crime. According to Elshtain, “The just war tradi-
tion […] predates the solidification of the nation-state system with the Treaty (or Peace) of 
Westphalia in 1648. In classic [i.e. the ‘earliest’ in my terminology] just war thinking, with 
its origins in Christian theology, jurisdictional boundaries were less defined and less im-
portant.”62 The idea that the sovereign be entitled to manage its own affairs without exter-
nal interference has little if not nothing to do with her view.63 Rather, her just war theory 
points in the same direction as the medieval theologians who asked mainly the right and 
wrong of offensive wars. 
This prompts Elshtain to ask for a far more powerful action in search for just peace 
than allowed by today’s international law. Though it ignores the modern just war recogni-
tion of the sovereign state system, the Augustine-influenced premodern just war idea to 
establish “the tranquility of order” is directly connected to the international situation of 
this century.64 As a result, when compared with Walzer, Elshtain is more oriented toward 
the practice of humanitarian intervention.65 While further proving the influence of Augus-
                                                 
60  ELSHTAIN, 2004a, p. 189; 2007, p. 136. 
61  ELSHTAIN, 2004b, p. 752. 
62  ELSHTAIN, 2004a, p. 183. 
63  As to her understanding that the sovereignty of god precedes that of states, see ELSHTAIN, Jean Bethke. 
Sovereignty: God, State, and Self. New York: Basic Books, 2008. 
64  ELSHTAIN, 2007, p. 137. 
65  ELSHTAIN, Jean Bethke. Just War and Humanitarian Intervention. American University International Law 
Review, v. 17, n. 1, 1-25, 2001. 
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tine on Elshtain, this also explains why she puts more emphasis on PCG when it comes to 
thinking about the justice of war. 
 
Summary and implications 
In sum, this article began with the question of why the same just war theorists 
have made completely different evaluations over the Iraq war. To address this query, this 
article went back to the genealogy of just war theory with some historical sketches, and 
clarified the splitting point between modern and premodern just war traditions at “the 
Grotian moment.” To begin, the modern tradition represented by Grotius upholds the 
principle of sovereignty, regards the war against CPG as the paradigmatic case of just war, 
and is relatively negative toward humanitarian intervention. Conversely, the premodern 
tradition represented by Augustine commits to establishing just peace, regards the war 
against PCG as the paradigmatic case of just war, and is definitively positive toward hu-
manitarian intervention. 
The contemporary American just war theory is under the influence of both these 
traditions. Walzer and Elshtain belong to the former and latter respectively, and develop 
their own theories under the analytically different but equally authentic paradigms. Just 
war theory is a long-standing thought that constitutes more than 1,600 years of history and 
has gone through some dramatic changes in accordance with the transformation of inter-
national reality. A single authoritarian conception of just war does not exist; as such, we 
have to be all the more aware of its pluralism since just war thinking has recently captured 
an expanding range of people from right to left wings. 
 
The case of Afghanistan as a mere coincidence 
The argument presented so far faces a seemingly straightforward objection: if they 
are plural traditions of just war, how do we explain the fact that both Walzer and Elshtain 
supported the Afghan war? The two cosigned the document “What we’re fighting for,” 
and, with more than sixty other American intellectuals, became vocal supporters of the 
War on Terror. However, a brief examination will suffice to refute this objection, because 
the joint chorus of just war theory since September 11 turns out to have been a mere coin-
cidence after all. The potential multiplicity within just war theory was not noticeable in 
opinions regarding the Afghan war, but was finally revealed in those of the Iraq war. 
Most of the contents of “What we’re fighting for” is Elshtainian rather than 
Walzerian in character. Though the official issuer is the Institute for American Values, the 
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key authors are said to be only seven, including Elshtain.66 Since the document is pub-
lished as an appendix of Elshtain’s book,67 it would be safe to assume that it has a close 
relationship to her position. The document contains a typically Augustinian statement that 
“The primary moral justification for war is to protect the innocent from certain harm,”68 
which suggests that Elshtain argued for the justification of the War on Terror on the PCG 
ground even at the time of Afghanistan. 
In Walzer’s case, the reason why he supported the Afghan war was not always 
matched with the “What we’re fighting for” document although he did sign it. From the 
beginning, for him, the War on Terror was placed on the CPG ground, the principal pur-
pose of which was no more and no less than the security of the United States. “I [Walzer] 
supported the war in Afghanistan because I believed that this was a defensive war (the 
paradigmatic case of just war).”69 The War on Terror was and has always been required to 
defend fellow Americans, not to liberate foreign citizens, so the argument goes. The objec-
tion against the distinction between modern and premodern just war traditions based on 
the fact that Walzer and Elshtain cosigned the same document fails to grasp the reality of 
the problem. 
 
 
What lies ahead? 
So far this article has answered the question with which it began. It is not at all 
contradictory or incoherent that Walzer and Elshtain have come to completely different 
conclusions through the same path of just war theory. Their differing views derive from 
the fact that they belong to different traditions, and further suggest that their consensus at 
the time of the Afghan war was coincidental. An especially important point to note is that 
the premodern just war tradition still enjoys considerable influence among American intel-
lectuals even in this century. 
Now, as mentioned at the beginning of the article, there has been a sudden revival 
of just war discourses not only among political theorists and public intellectuals, but also 
policy makers and ordinary citizens in today’s United States. I examined the document 
“What we’re fighting for” as an example of this revival in the last section. In this section, I 
end with an assessment of whether the Walzerian just war version or the Elshtainian one 
has been gaining more popularity in the current climate of the United States. 
                                                 
66  The other authors are Enola Aird, David Blankenhorn, Francis Fukuyama, Robert P. George, Mary Glen-
don and James Q. Wilson. ETZIONI, Amitai; MARSH, Jason H. (Eds.). Rights vs. Public Safety after 9/11: 
America in the Age of Terrorism. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, p. 101. 
67  ELSHTAIN, 2004a, pp. 193-218. 
68  ELSHTAIN, 2004a, p. 200. 
69  WALZER, 2007a, p. 299. 
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Example 1: the Bush administration 
To determine which just war tradition has more support today, let us begin by an-
alyzing the discourse within the U.S. government. Honest or not, the Bush administration 
categorized the American War on Terror as part of a just war. President Bush delivered a 
speech at a Joint Session of Congress twelve days after September 11, asserting that 
“Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be 
done.”70 The National Security Strategy in 2002, also known as the Bush Doctrine, con-
tained the claim that “The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and 
the cause just.”71 Indeed, “Enduring Freedom,” the U.S. military operation in Afghanistan, 
was originally named “Infinite Justice.” 
What kind of “justice” did the Bush administration hope to accomplish by the War 
on Terror? Seemingly, their logic was obscure and sometimes incoherent, being a mix of 
distinct ideas on sovereignty and just peace. However, the validity of attacking Iraq 
preemptively without being invaded and aiming at overthrowing the Hussein regime 
does not come out from the logic of sovereignty at all. Indeed, President Bush sent the fol-
lowing message to the Iraqi people in a speech just before launching the war, which shows 
that he relied on the idea of building just peace in their country: 
If we must begin a military campaign, it will be directed against the lawless 
men who rule your country and not against you. As our coalition takes 
away their power, we will deliver the food and medicine you need. […] In 
a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of aggression against your neigh-
bors, no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more 
torture chambers and rape rooms. The tyrant will soon be gone. The day of 
your liberation is near.72 
The Bush administration did not seem to pay appropriate attention to the princi-
ple of sovereignty. Specifically, they introduced a new national security strategy of 
preemptive strike instead of the past cold war strategy of deterrence. The administration 
argued that anti-U.S. terrorists would not be restrained by the threat of counterattack; in 
other words, waiting until a first strike would not be wise or necessary. In the same speech 
Bush declares, “We choose to meet that threat now, where it arises, before it can appear 
suddenly in our skies and cities.”73 This idea of so-called “preemptive/anticipatory self-
defense” clearly departs from the conventional dichotomy of self-defense/aggression.74 
                                                 
70  BUSH, George W. We Will Prevail: President George W. Bush on War, Terrorism, and Freedom. New York: 
Continuum, 2003, p. 12. 
71  COLUMBUS, Frank. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. New York: Novinka 
Books, 2003, p. 23. 
72  BUSH, 2003, p. 233. 
73  BUSH, 2003, p. 234. 
74  See n.47 above. 
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This means that the Bush administration made an important revision to the modern idea 
that each sovereign state complies with the rule of not attacking unless being attacked or 
at least threatened. 
To summarize, the just war discourse of the Bush administration is more akin to 
the Augustinian than the Grotian paradigm in that it sticks to establishing just peace while 
disregarding a foreign state’s territorial sovereignty.75 Since the two paradigms are quite 
different in terms of both their theoretical settings and the content of just war, we need to 
be cautious against the arbitrary misuse of them by the government officials. Being faithful 
to the latter, Augustinian paradigm would be far more influential than at first glance, since 
this might consequently lead to rethinking the modern sovereign state system itself. 
 
Example 2: liberal hawks 
Similar to the discourse of the Bush administration, neo-Augustinianism can also 
be found in the opposite liberal side as well. Since the end of the Cold War, there have 
been a growing number of liberals who remain reformist and idealist but at the same time 
revise their conventional foreign policy and expect the United States to have more active 
military participation in foreign affairs. These individuals are generally called “liberal 
hawks,” and, along with neo-conservatives, made the decision to support the U.S. military 
missions in Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond.76 The key figures include Paul Berman, Peter 
Beinart, Christopher Hitchens, David Rieff, and Michael Ignatieff, whom I will discuss 
below. 
Before the War on Terror, Ignatieff had already been known as a positive interven-
tionist based on such works as Responsibility to Protect, which he helped to prepare and 
was published in 2001. He later affirmed the Iraq war, saying that the war aiming at over-
throwing the Hussein regime can be justified on the humanitarian ground.77 He reasoned 
that the Hussein regime was aggressive externally, persecuted national and religious mi-
norities, and had a history of using chemical weapons that would lead to the development 
of WMD. Thus “The disagreeable reality for those who believe in human rights is that 
                                                 
75  As to the Augustinian and anti-Grotian character of the Bush Doctrine, see MANSFIELD, Stephen. The 
Faith of George W. Bush. New York: Jeremy Tarcher, 2003, pp. 143-6; MAY, Larry. Aggression and Crimes 
against Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp.75-8.  
76  See PARMAR, Inderjeet. Foreign Policy Fusion: Liberal Interventionists, Conservative Nationalists and 
Neoconservatives - the New Alliance Dominating the US Foreign Policy Establishment. International Poli-
tics, v. 46, n. 2-3, 177–209, 2009; RYAN, Maria. Bush’s “Useful Idiots”: 9/11, the Liberal Hawks and the 
Cooption of the “War on Terror.” Journal of American Studies, v. 45, n. 4, 67-93, 2011. 
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there are some occasions - and Iraq may be one of them - when war is the only real remedy 
for regimes that live by terror.”78 
Now, the union of neo-conservatives and liberal hawks to support the Iraq war is 
characterized by the same nonmodern just war idea of establishing just peace. A further 
noteworthy point is that both neo-conservatives and liberal hawks are commonly appeal-
ing to the image of “empire” in the context of the War on Terror.79 Ignatieff, for instance, 
ties the Iraqi problem with the American imperial project and insists that the United States 
bear the obligation to maintain order and justice on the worldwide scale.80 Needless to say, 
such international obligation does not fit well with the modern sovereign state system and 
its principle of nonintervention. 
From a historical point of view, we can find some intimate connections between 
just war theory and the empire. Augustine developed his theory in the era of the ancient 
Roman Empire. Vitoria and Suárez tackled the problem of the right or wrong of the Span-
ish Empire’s conquest of South America and the subjugation of native people. Seen this 
way, it seems more than accidental that the new Augustinian tradition is gaining populari-
ty in the post-Cold War America. The correlation between the revival of just war theory 
and the contemporary emergence of “empire” has been explored only fragmentally in the 
previous studies,81 and seems to need a more detailed analysis on a comparative historical 
perspective. 
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this article has been to provide a comprehensive explanation for the 
competing evaluations over the Iraq war by introducing a historical and analytical distinc-
tion into the multiplicity found in the American just war theory of this century. The key 
findings of this article are as follows: first, the traditions of just war theory can be divided 
roughly into two categories before and after the emergence of the sovereign state system. 
One is the modern Grotian tradition that regards the war against CPG as the authentic 
case of just war under the principle of sovereignty, and the other the premodern Augus-
tinian tradition that regards the war against PCG under the principle of just peace. A sec-
ond noteworthy finding is that Walzer and Elshtain belong to modern and premodern just 
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war traditions accordingly, which is reflected in their different evaluations over the Iraq 
war, and also suggests that their consensus over the Afghan war is a coincidental one. 
Lastly, the American just war discourses found among the Bush administration and liberal 
hawks share greater commonality with the premodern tradition than the modern one in 
that they put higher priority on just peace over sovereignty. 
I want to finally point out suggestions and the task of further inquiries that arise 
from the conclusions of this article. First, when taking up just war theory in the field of 
international relations, we need to further take into account its internal varieties. A lot of 
the current research, especially in the international relations studies, tends almost exclu-
sively to rely on Walzer as the bibliographical authority, and therefore simply to assume 
the paradigm of the modern just war tradition without question. But it is not always accu-
rate to think of Walzer’s work as exemplary. In the postwar United States, for instance, 
there is a continuous (partly theological) strand of neo-Augustinianism such as Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Paul Ramsey, James Turner Johnson, George Weigel, as well as Elshtain. Moreo-
ver, we would not be able to appropriately analyze the current discourses of the Bush ad-
ministration and liberal hawks unless we take the diversity of just war theory itself into 
consideration. 
Furthermore, the conclusions drawn in this article can be useful for analyzing U.S. 
diplomatic policy. U.S. diplomatic policy has traditionally been under the strong influence 
of realistic thinkers such as George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, and Zbigniew Brzeziński, 
but especially since the end of the Cold War, the just war way of thinking seems to have 
become more and more relevant. To take some examples from recent times, a neo-
conservative thinktank under the Bush administration was mostly based on realism but 
partially appealed to just war theory.82 Elshtain also took part in real politics as a council 
member of an independent federal agency at the time of the Bush administration. Note, 
especially, that the rhetoric of just war is seen even in President Obama today. It is beyond 
the scope of this article to analyze how substantially just war theory shapes U.S. diplomat-
ic policy; however, when addressing this issue, it might be important to keep the diversity 
of just war theory in mind. 
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